We consider competitive markets for multiple commodities with endogenous formation of one-or two-person households. Within each two-person household, externalities from the partner's commodity consumption and unpriced actions are allowed. Each individual has two types of traits: observable characteristics and unobservable taste characteristics. Each individual gets utility from his/her own private consumption, from discrete actions such as job-choice, from the partner's observable characteristics such as appearance and hobbies, from some of the partner's consumption vectors, and from the partner's action choices. We investigate competitive market outcomes with an endogenous household structure in which no individual and no man/womanpair can deviate profitably. We find a set of sufficient conditions under which a stable matching equilibrium exists. We further establish the first welfare theorem for this economy.
Introduction
In their seminal contribution, Gale and Shapley (1962) show that stable matching of partners obtains. The main results of the subsequent literature on two-sided matching are surveyed in Roth and Sotomayor (1990) . A parallel literature, starting with the seminal paper of Shapley and Shubik (1972) , has established the existence of stable outcomes in assignment games. In most of these models, markets for commodities are inactive simply because there exists at most one tradeable commodity. 1 Moreover, there is no detailed interaction of matched partners such as collective decisions on consumption or actions. In other words, only one mechanism to bring about an allocation is at work in standard matching or assignment games. In contrast, Gersbach and Haller (2011) develop a formal framework that integrates three allocation mechanisms operating at different levels of aggregation. First, individual decisions are made to join or leave households. Second, collective decisions within households determine the consumption plans of household members. Third, competitive exchange across households yields a feasible allocation of resources. Gersbach and Haller (2001) took a first step and incorporated the collective rationality concept of Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 ) into a general equilibrium framework -which allowed to study the interaction between the second and the third allocation mechanism: collective decisions and competitive markets. Haller (2010, 2011 ) added elements of the first allocation mechanism to the model, by considering endogenous household structures and amending the equilibrium conditions with stability requirements known from the matching literature. Gersbach and Haller (2011) show that two tradeable commodities may already endanger stable matchings in finite populations. They present an example with two private commodities and household formation reducible to a two-sided matching problem in which stable matchings and market clearing cannot be achieved simultaneously. The reason is that when households trade actively, different matchings may be associated with different price systems that clear commodity markets if consumption externalities are present or if group externalities are not separable. In such cases, individuals may find it optimal, for instance, to split at the going market prices to reduce negative consumption externalities. However, when the household structure changes and market clearing prices change, individuals may find it optimal to remarry or match again. Incompatibility of stable matching and market clearing does not disappear under replication.
It remains open, however, whether the non-existence problem is a consequence of having a finite population. In this paper, therefore, we explore the compatibility of stable household structures and market clearing for a continuum of individuals. In addition to the standard matching model, we also allow for a richer interaction of household members.
More specifically, we consider a market economy in which any two partners of opposite sex can form a household. Within each two-person household, externalities from the partner's commodity consumption in some categories and unpriced actions are allowed. Each individual has two characteristics: observable characteristics, which may include a taste component, and unobservable taste characteristics. Each individual gets utility from its own private consumption and discrete actions (such as job choice), the partner's observable characteristics (such as appearance and known hobbies), the partner's consumption vector in certain categories, and the action choice of the partner.
Partners in a household jointly choose consumption bundles and actions. They achieve intra-household Pareto efficiency. Such negotiated outcomes have to be stable, i.e., they have to be immune against (a) deviation of individuals who would fare better on their own and (b) a deviation of an arbitrary pair of individuals who could form a household and could choose a feasible allocation of commodities and actions. Stable matching and market clearing together define a stable matching equilibrium.
Our main result is a set of sufficient conditions under which a stable matching equilibrium exists. We illustrate the advantage of the continuum version over the corresponding finite population model by means of an example based on the motivating counter-example in Gersbach and Haller (2011) . We further show a first welfare theorem.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the model and define matching and feasible allocations in the continuum economy. In section three, we define a stable matching equilibrium and illustrate it by an example. In section four we state our main result. Section five is devoted to welfare analysis. There we show that every stable matching equilibrium is efficient under an appropriate definition of Pareto efficiency of allocations. Section six concludes. The proof of the main result is contained in the appendix.
The Basic Model
The basic model describes and defines consumer and household characteristics, the production sector, and feasible allocations.
Individuals and Couples
There is a continuum of individuals with two different kinds of characteristics -observable characteristics and unobservable taste characteristics. The set of observable characteristics is partitioned into two finite non-empty sets M and W . The sets M and W denote a list of male types and female types, respectively. An element m ∈ M (w ∈ W ) describes a type m male's (type w female's) observable characteristics -his (her) appearance and observable hobbies etc. -that may be cared for by a partner w ∈ W (m ∈ M ). For expositional purposes, we will assume that each male (female) will be either matched with a female (male) or stay single. , the population measure of w-type having taste-type θ is zero. Whenever warranted, we distinguish sets and variables attributed to females by˜.
Asymmetric information in the form of unobservable (taste) characteristics is not crucial for our analysis. The model and the proofs would work perfectly well when all taste characteristics were observable. But our approach is not limited to that case. Hence we choose the more general setting, allowing for asymmetric information, where our approach still applies.
We assume that M , W and Θ are all finite sets. We use the distribution approach to describe consumers: Let N (m,θ) (N (w,θ) ) be the population measure of type (m, θ) ((w, θ)) with ( ,θ)∈(M ∪W )×Θ N ( ,θ) = N > 0. To make the analysis relevant at all, we further assume that both the male and the female population have positive measure:
2 Yet such two-sidedness is not essential in our model. (We could allow roommate problems or same sex partnerships.)
Actions
Let A be a finite non-empty action set that is common to all individuals.
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A typical example for an action is a consumer's job choice. But the consumer's opportunities are not necessarily limited to job choice. E.g., an action can indicate the number of kids to have, or which spouse primarily takes care of kids etc. Each job may have a different wage rate and different time commitment. That is, a person's leisure endowment in particular is dependent on her job choice, not only because wage rates are different 4 , but also because the time available for leisure consumption can differ. For example, the minimum working hours or commuting time can vary. Moreover, if action a means that a spouse commits to taking care of kids primarily, his (her) leisure endowment would shrink since his (her) time to spend on the job or leisure needs to be reduced.
Consumption Sets, Endowments, and Job Choice
Sets I = {1, ..., I} and K = {I + 1, ..., I + K} denote the set of commodities without externalities (as when reading books), and the set of commodities with externalities (such as from smoking) to and from the partner if matched, respectively. These sets are common to all individuals, regardless whether they are matched or single. Each male with observable type m ∈ M has an endowment bundle dependent on his action, given by a mapping e 3 This is again for notational simplicity. We can obtain the same results allowing action sets to be dependent on observable types: For m ∈ M and w ∈ W , action sets A m and A w are finite. 4 The type of labor being different implies that the type of leisure is different: There exists a difference in opportunity costs due to wage rate differentials.
If consumers cannot buy more leisure than their time endowments, the consumption set typically cannot be R I+K + itself. For example, suppose that there are J jobs representing different types of labor inputs and associated leisure choices. Then, a type m man's consumption set and endowment are dependent on the chosen action a ∈ A in the following manner: Let {I + 1, ..., I + J} = J ⊂ K be the set of different types of labor (J ≤ K).
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If consumer m's choice is a ∈ A, then his job choice associated with his action choice a ∈ A is some j(a) ∈ {I + 1, ..., I + J}, his endowment given a ∈ A is and his consumption set is, assuming that he cannot buy more leisure than his time endowment:
This rich setup allows for many different situations: We will assume that ∪ a∈A j(a) = J which means that for every job j ∈ J , there exists an action that entails that job.
We further assume that (non-externality) commodity 1 in I is a special good as we shall specify in more detail in Section 4. In particular, we write for all m ∈ M and all a ∈ A, X 
Preferences
Male type (m, θ) ∈ M × Θ has the following utility presentation. If he is matched and his partner has (observable) type w ∈ W , then his utility function is u 5 By positing J ⊂ K, we are assuming that leisure consumption by a man/woman affects his/her spouse's utility.
where a ∈ A and x = ( 
where a ∈ A and x = (x I , x K ) ∈ X m (a). Note that there is no externality in consumption in this case. The same comment applies to the case of w being single.
Female type (w,θ) ∈ W × Θ has utility function u
if she is matched with observable male type m ∈ M . She has utility function u
if she is single.
Matching
In order to define an allocation, we impose assumptions on the populations of individuals and the number of couples. LetΓ would be the set of all possible household types. However, it proves more convenient to augment a household type by its members' actions because household members' endowments and consumption sets depend on their action choices and, thus, the set of feasible allocations in each household depends on the actions taken by its members. Augmented or extended household type sets are defined as follows. Let Γ
A matching is a mapping µ : 6 Working with augmented household types also helps overcome the non-convexity problem associated with discrete action set A.
Γ → R + such that µ(γ) is the Lebesgue measure of households of augmented type γ ∈ Γ.
In our formal derivations, we shall further assume Measurement Consistency (MC). This is a technical assumption how population sizes line up in a continuum economy. In our context, it requires that coincide. MC has been introduced by Kaneko and Wooders (1986) , to properly account for resources consumed by finite coalitions in a continuum economy. We will assume MC throughout the paper. Now, we can define feasibility of matchings. A matching µ is feasible if we have:
for all (w,θ) ∈ W × Θ.
Production
We next introduce production. We assume that the aggregate production technology exhibits constant returns to scale so that there will not be profits in equilibrium. We denote the aggregate production set by Y ⊂ R I+K .
Feasible Allocations
Let the household consumption correspondence X :
Frequently, we shall write x γ instead of x(γ). Let X be the set of all selections of X . Three details ought to be noted here. First, taste types θ,θ do not affect feasibility of household consumption. Second, this definition presumes that households of the same type choose identical consumption, an "equal treatment property" for households. 7 Third, although we list a consumption plan for all possible types of households, we do not require that all types of households must be present in equilibrium. In a symmetric household consumption allocation x ∈ X,
is the consumption combination of couples of type γ;
is the consumption bundle of singles of type γ;
is the consumption bundle of singles of type γ.
A (symmetric) consumption allocation is a pair (x, µ) where x ∈ X is a symmetric household consumption allocation and µ is a matching. A feasible allocation is a triple (x, µ, y) such that (x, µ) is a consumption allocation and y ∈ Y is a production vector satisfying
where we set e
. A production plan y ∈ Y is feasible if it is part of a feasible allocation (x, µ, y). For later use we establish sufficient conditions to ensure that the set of feasible production plans is bounded. 7 Obviously, we can assign different consumption-action combinations to two households of the same type. In this sense, the equilibrium concept proposed below is not the most general one. More general definitions using the "distribution approach" can be found in Mas-Colell (1984) or Zame (2007) . Notice, however, that we need Pareto indifference among realized equilibrium outcomes since consumers are free to choose available policies in the market. We will assume convex preferences for our main theorem. Therefore, we essentially lose nothing by choosing the simpler definition. 
Equilibrium Analysis
In this section we specify first the choices available to households and next how households decide. Then we introduce the equilibrium concept, stable matching equilibrium. Finally, we present an example, the continuum version of Example 3 in Gersbach and Haller (2011).
Household Decisions
: i∈I p i + k∈K p k = 1} be the set of price vectors. For p ∈ ∆, a couple of observable type (m, w) has (for any θ,θ ∈ Θ) the budget set dependent of their actions (a,ã) ∈ A × A,
The members of that household determine their consumption-action bundles either by negotiating or independently. If consumption or action externalities within the household are absent, then the members can choose their consumption-action vectors independently, achieving an intra-household efficient allocation. In general, however, 
That is, the members can negotiate over B andB by taking their outside options (by deviating unilaterally or by finding another partner) into account. However, as is well known, independent decisions need not lead to intra-household efficiency in the presence of externalities.
Therefore, it is natural to think about a contract over consumption and actions together with a budget share agreement between the partners. Note that both members of a household contribute their endowments to the household joint budget first and then receive budget shares (allowances) for consumption of goods in I. If for example, good j ∈ J is a type of leisure (based on the male partner's job choice a), then p j is the corresponding wage rate (or opportunity cost of leisure). In this case, he has to contribute p j e m j (a) to the household first, and buy back afterwards some of the leisure time x m j by using his "allowance" (that is residual income share) B. This is the same as deciding on labor supply e m j (a) − x m j yielding net allowance B − p j x m j , which can be negative. Here, a further issue is that such a contract must be formed without knowing the true preference types of partners, although the contract can be contingent on their observable types and reported taste types.
A single's budget constraint is easier to describe. A type m male has a budget set (for any θ ∈ Θ) dependent on his action a ∈ A,
A type (m, θ) male chooses a ∈ A and x ∈ B (m,a) (p) to maximize his utility u (m,θ) (x, a; ∅). Similarly, a type w female has a budget set (for anyθ ∈ Θ) dependent on her actionã ∈ A,
A type (w,θ) female choosesã ∈ A andx ∈ B (w,ã) (p) to maximize her utility
Negotiations over Intra-Household Allocation (Consumption and Actions)
We think of an ideal situation of negotiations within a household (between partners). They try to achieve an intra-household Pareto efficient allocation given their reported preference types (and their observable types) that is immune to joint deviations with other partners (with negotiated allocations) and to single deviations as well.
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Suppose that (observable) types m and w met discussing their potential intra-household allocation. They report their taste types (truthfully or manipulatively) θ andθ to each other, and jointly choose their actions and consumption vectors that cause externalities to the partners. An intra-household Pareto-efficient allocation given the participation constraints needs to ensure that their utilities from the allocation exceed or equal U 
These indirect utility functions describe what a member of a household can achieve when an agreement over consumption and action vectors (
and an expenditure sharing rule (allowances for commodity consumption without externalities) (B,B) has been reached. Now, we will consider negotiations between husband and wife -or more generally, male and female partner. Let us denote again the wife's consumption-action vector by tildes (˜). Consider a couple consisting of types (m, θ) and (w,θ). A feasible plan for observable types m and w under p is a list (B,
Denote the set of feasible plans for observable types m and w under p by C[m, w; p]. The negotiation problem between (m, θ) and (w,θ) is to find a feasible plan (B,
that is agreeable to them. If they report their preference types θ andθ before negotiation takes place, then the negotiation problem may become the one to find an intrahousehold Pareto efficient allocation for types (m, θ) and (w,θ): a feasible plan (B,
and at least one strict inequality in (i) or (ii).
Given that there are unobservable characteristics, it is perfectly legitimate for types (m, θ) and (w,θ) to report (m, ϑ) and (w,θ) before they enter the negotiation stage. Note that even if (m, θ) pretends to be (m, ϑ), his partner (w,θ) (or actually (w,θ)) does not care what actual taste he has, as long as his observable type is m (his appearance and observable hobbies etc.) and both agree with his consumption and action vectors (x K , a).
The situation would be different in a model where each couple is committed to a specific bargaining protocol or mechanism, for instance a specific asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as in Gori (2010) . Then the partner's taste parameters would matter and misrepresentation could prove advantageous.
Stable Matching Equilibrium
Our concept of equilibrium requires a feasible allocation such that (i) men and women are free to choose a partner and negotiate a budget-feasible intrahousehold allocation with that partner or, alternatively, stay single; (ii) there is no pair of male and female types who can be better off by deviating from the equilibrium allocation by negotiating their after-deviation intra-household allocation. Our equilibrium concept is described formally as follows.
Definition. A stable matching equilibrium is a quadruple (p, x, µ, y) where p ∈ ∆ is a price system; (x, µ, y) is a feasible allocation and the following conditions 1-4 hold:
1. Single-Household Efficiency 
with at least one strict inequality.
2.b: If
with µ(γ) > 0 and µ(δ) > 0, then there is no feasible plan for observable types m and w under p,
; ∅) with at least one strict inequality.
2.c: If
2.d: If
Stable Matching II (immunity to single deviations)
For each γ = (m, θ, a; w,θ,ã) ∈ Γ C with µ(γ) > 0: u (m,θ) (x γ I , x γ K , a; w,x γ K ,ã) ≥ sup a ∈A sup x∈B (m,a ) (p) u (m,θ) (x, a ; ∅); u (w,θ) (x γ I ,x γ K ,ã; m, x γ K , a) ≥ sup a ∈A sup x∈B (w,ã ) (p) u (w,θ) (x,ã ; ∅).
Profit Maximization
py ≥ py for all y ∈ Y . Remark 1. The reason that supremum in condition 3 is used is that there may not be optimal consumption plans for nonexisting (negligible) household types with constituent characteristics (m, θ) or (w,θ) such that N (m,θ) = 0 or N (w,θ) = 0. Note that intra-household allocations for γ with µ(γ) = 0 play no role. They are included in the definition only for simplicity of notation.
Next we present an example that illustrates the advantage of a continuum model over the corresponding finite population model.
An Example
This example is the continuum version of Example 3 in Gersbach and Haller (2011). There are only two observable types, m and w, and one unobservable type θ 0 which we can ignore. We assume N 
with parameters 0 < ρ < 1, 0 < k < 1, 0 < g and the convention ln 0 = −∞.
In the finite version, that is Example 3 of Gersbach and Haller, there are two males and one female, and commodity 2 is the one that causes externalities. For certain parameter values, the finite version does not have an equilibrium nor does any replica of it. Now let us turn to the continuum version. We are going to show existence of equilibrium for all parameter constellations. If the finite version has an equilibrium, then obviously, the continuum model has one as well. Suppose the finite version does not have an equilibrium. Let ξ = µ((m, w)) denote the fraction of females that are matched. Let us consider price systems of the form p = (p I , p K ) = (1, p K ). Note that for convenience, we choose here a different price normalization than in the main model. With this normalization, p / ∈ ∆ unless p K = 0. In equilibrium, necessarily x I = 0, x K = 1. Taking this as a constraint, a female's demand for the K-commodity is
which has to equal 1 to clear the market. Therefore, the market clearing price is
The resulting demands are Incidentally,
which is an irrational number. Therefore, in that case there does not exist an equilibrium for any replica of the finite model.
The Main Result
Only in fairly simple cases like the example of subsection 3. 
is continuous and quasi-concave in x I , x K , andx K , and satisfies local nonsatiation in I; and for all (w,θ) ∈ W × Θ, all m ∈ M and all a,ã ∈ A, u (w,θ)
is continuous and quasi-concave iñ x I ,x K , and x K , and satisfies local nonsatiation in I. :
is strictly quasi-concave; and (c) for all x, x ∈ R I+K−J + , there exists x 1 > 0 such that Assumptions 1 and 2 are standard. Assumption 1 (ii) requires that every type has positive endowment in commodity 1 -and the price of commodity 1 will be positive in equilibrium due to assumption 4. Assumption 2 further requires quasi-concavity of an individual's utility function including its spouse's consumption vector (for each possible spouse and each action vector). We need quasi-concave utility because of consumption externalities within a couple. It is assumed in order to find a Pareto optimal intrahousehold allocation.
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Assumption 3 is a variation of a standard assumption when the consumption set is not connected (indivisible commodities: see Mas-Colell (1977), Wooders (1978) , and Ellickson (1979) for the spirit of this assumption). This assumption is the simplest way to achieve the closed graph property of the demand correspondence (Mas-Colell 1977).
Assumption 4 requires that there is a type of man (alternatively, a type of woman) who only cares about non-leisure commodity consumption (no concern about his job and his partner), whose endowment is positive for all commodities relative to his job choice, and who strongly prefers commodity 1. The implication of Assumption 4 is that a type (m,θ) man will choose the highest paid job for this type, has positive wealth at any price system, and would consume an unbounded consumption vector if commodity 1's price went to zero. This boundary behavior contradicts feasibility, by Lemma 1. Thus, assumption 4 together with assumption 1 assures that the price of commodity 1 is positive in equilibrium, which avoids the violation of lower hemi-continuity of budget sets.
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Assumption 5 is standard.
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Assumption 5 (i), free disposal in production, assures that there is exact market clearing in equilibrium, that is, where 10 This assumption was used in Konishi (2010) in a more restrictive local externality case. See also Konishi (2013) . Specifically, we use the Shafer-Sonnenschein (1975) mapping for the existence of a Pareto-efficient equilibrium. Thus, we need that the union of upper contour sets has an open graph (continuity) and is (semi) convex-valued (convex preferences). 11 We use the technique illustrated in the proof of Proposition 17.C.1 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995) .
12 Any convex (decreasing returns to scale) technology can be described by constant aggregate excess demand z (= lhs of (1) − rhs of (1) 
for all males and (x I ,x K ) = (1 − χ, 0) for all females constitutes a stable matching equilibrium with z = (0, −1). Indeed, these are all stable matching equilibria. We assume that M , W , and Θ are finite. This assumption is important in our proof that employs the Kakutani fixed point theorem. Note that Kaneko and Wooders (1986) prove the non-emptiness of the f -core in any finite type characteristic function-form game. We cannot apply their theorem to show the existence of stable marriage equilibrium since (i) inter-household trade is feasible in our model, and (ii) preference type θ is hidden information. Also note that Ellickson et al. (1999) and Allouch et al. (2009) cannot be used either to prove the Theorem, since we have intra-household consumption externalities.
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The proof of the Theorem is involved, and is provided in the appendix.
returns to scale technology by introducing managerial inputs as consumers' endowment (see McKenzie, 1959) .
13 See Gersbach and Haller (2010) for the (lack of) equivalence of "club models" and "household models".
Welfare Analysis
Let (x, µ, y) and (x , µ , y ) be two feasible allocations. Informally, we would like to say that (x , µ , y ) improves upon (x, µ, y) if every consumer is at least as well off at (x , µ , y ) as at (x, µ, y) and a group of consumers of positive measure is better off at (x , µ , y ). Since we take the distributional approach, such a statement requires that the two allocations are aligned the right way.
To explain the matter, let us take a short digression. Let us consider a pure exchange economy with two commodities and generic consumption bun- 
. Can we say that everybody is better off in x?
The answer depends on further distributional details. If in fact half of the consumers get x under x and x under x and half of the consumers get x under x and x under x, then everybody is better off in x. But this is not the case if half of the consumers get x under x and x under x and half of the consumers get x under x and x under x. Nor is it the case if, for instance, 20% of the consumers get x under x and x under x, 30% get x under x and x under x, 20% get x under x and x under x, and 30% get x under x and x under x.
Strictly speaking, then (x , µ , y ) potentially improves upon (x, µ, y) if consumers can be aligned in such a way that every consumer is at least as well off at (x , µ , y ) as at (x, µ, y) and a group of consumers of positive measure is better off at (x , µ , y ).
That means in detail (where at least one of the inequalities ≥ in (A) or (B) is strict):
.
• such that:
•
14 Here the notation x (γ) andx (γ) instead of x γ andx γ , respectively, proves more transparent.
• If γ = (w,θ,ã ; m , θ , a ), δ = (w,θ,ã; m, θ, a) ∈ Γ C with λ
Definition. A feasible allocation (x, µ, y) is a Pareto optimal allocation (or a Pareto optimum) if there is no feasible allocation (x , µ , y ) that potentially improves upon (x, µ, y).
Proposition 2 Suppose that (p, µ, x, y) is a stable matching equilibrium, consumers are locally non-satiated with respect to consumption of commodities without externalities, and the production set satisfies constant returns to scale. Then (x, µ, y) is a Pareto optimal allocation.
Note that the assumptions of the main theorem imply that consumers are locally non-satiated with respect to consumption of commodity 1.
Proof. Suppose that (p, µ, x, y) is a stable matching equilibrium, consumers are locally non-satiated with respect to consumption of commodities without externalities, and (x, µ, y) is not a Pareto optimal allocation. Let then (x , µ , y ) be a feasible allocation that potentially improves upon (x, µ, y). That is, (A) and (B) hold, with at least one of the inequalities ≥ being strict. Now take for instance two extended male types γ = (m, θ, a ) and δ = (m, θ, a) with λ Because of constant returns to scale, py = 0 and py ≤ 0. It follows that for the allocation (x , µ , y ), p·(lhs of (1)) exceeds p·(rhs of (1)). Since p ≥ 0, (x , µ , y ) must therefore violate (1), in contradiction to its presumed feasibility.
Remark 2. With additional notational and expositional effort, one can show that an equilibrium allocation cannot be improved upon by a feasible allocation where individuals or couples of the same type can differ in their consumptive decisions. Also, along the lines of the foregoing proof, a core inclusion result can be obtained instead of the first welfare theorem.
Conclusion
In this paper, we define an equilibrium for a market economy in which any two partners of opposite sex can form a household. Within each two-person household, externalities from the partner's commodity consumption in some categories and non-priced actions (such as job choice) are allowed. The main result is a set of sufficient conditions under which a stable matching equilibrium exists. We illustrate the advantage of the continuum version over the corresponding finite population model by means of an example based on the motivating counter-example in Gersbach and Haller (2011). We also prove efficiency of every stable matching equilibrium allocation under an appropriate definition of efficiency.
In our model, consumers can choose actions which encompass job choice, an attractive feature absent from prior models of pairwise matching and previous general equilibrium models with endogenous household formation. Typically then, one would not expect a consumer to be endowed with labor of various skills, only with the kind of labor compatible with her action and job choice. But then, a consumer's endowment bundle may lie on the boundary of her consumption set. This in turn tends to cause discontinuity of the budget correspondence and lack of upper hemi-continuity of the demand correspondence, a challenge in proving existence of equilibrium. There are various ways to overcome that obstacle. Assumption 4 of our existence theorem postulates a particular type of consumers who guarantees a boundary condition with respect to the first commodity; cf. Lemma 3. Combined with the further assumptions, this circumvents the upper hemi-continuity problem of demand correspondences. Instead, we could postulate a CobbDouglas type of agents of positive measure with strictly positive endowment bundle, who does not impose any externalities and whose utility depends only on own consumption. Such a special consumer type yields the standard boundary condition. As a third alternative, one could follow Mirrlees (1971) and postulate that all kinds of labor are perfect substitutes. Then all kinds of leisure or labor could be measured in efficiency units in terms of some normalized labor input and we could proceed as if normalized labor was the only type of labor input and each consumer was endowed with it.
Our definition of stable matching equilibrium allows for complete and efficient contracts between two partners -binding agreements over their actions and consumption vectors that generate externalities to each other and over residual budget shares to be spent on consumption without externalities. This is an idealized concept that offers the best chance for the first welfare theorem to hold, and indeed, it has been proven in addition to the existence result. The complete contract assumption is certainly very strong. As an alternative, the club literature only requires club members to pay fees in return for local public goods, club goods and projects, and possibly the company of other club members. A consumer is free to spend the remaining budget on private consumption. However, by doing so, the consumers no longer internalize consumption externalities within groups (couples, households, clubs, jurisdictions). The resulting group decisions would no longer be efficient and, as a rule, equilibrium allocations would cease to be Pareto optimal, if intra-group consumption externalities exist. We refer to Gersbach and Haller (2010) for a comparison of the "household model" and the "club model". It could be fruitful to define a stable matching equilibrium concept with incomplete contracting of action and consumption choices and to investigate how the degree of (in)completeness affects equilibrium outcomes. This task is left for future research.
We will construct a fixed point mapping ϕ : Φ Φ and its domain Φ in eleven steps. In these steps, we are going to define a number of mappings (functions and correspondences) that constitute ϕ and whose domains (and ranges) are components of Φ. After truncating some of the domains (and ranges), Φ and ϕ satisfy the assumptions of Kakutani's fixed point theorem. In a last step, it can be shown that a subsequence of fixed point prices and allocations converges to a stable matching equilibrium when the truncation is gradually removed.
First, in order to prove the theorem, we will introduce a hypothetical demographic designer (DD) and hypothetical gender-dependent membership prices for each household type. 
To be precise, (5) Second, note that production technologies are assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale, and there will be zero profit in equilibrium in our model. However, when we prove existence of equilibrium, we need to specify how profits are distributed in off-equilibrium states. For simplicity, assume that there is only one firm (or many identical firms). Let ψ m (and ψ w ) be the share of the firm that type m men (type w women) own: That is, , respectively, where y ∈ Y is a production vector. When we work on the proof of equilibrium existence, we will modify budget constraints in the following manner:
Clearly, when p · y = 0 and r 
:
∈I∪K p = 1}, which is a price simplex. We will treat commodity 1 differently in order to assure p 1 > 0 in equilibrium, and we let∆ 1 ≡ {p ∈ ∆ : p 1 > 0} and ∂∆ 1 ≡ {p ∈ ∆ : p 1 = 0}. We will show that any fixed point price vector of our fixed point mapping is in∆ 1 (see below). Letē = max (j,a)∈(M ∪W )×A {max ∈I∪K e j (a)} and R = [−2ē, 2ē], whereē denotes the highest possible income a consumer can obtain among all p ∈ ∆. We allow for negative membership prices, since a couple may crosssubsidize each other. (At least one partner needs to pay a positive price, but the other may get a transfer from him/her.) The membership price set is denoted by R 2Γ C , with representative elements r ∈ R 2Γ C .
Fourth, for all γ ∈ Γ C , we construct a mapping β γ K that assigns a Paretoefficient allocation of goods with externalities (those in K) to γ. This procedure needs some preparation.
be a correspondence that describes feasible consumption plans of commodities with externalities such that
, otherwise. I.e., in order to obtain a correspondence, we assume that 0 is feasible for household γ even if it is actually infeasible.
By choosing feasible γ = (m, θ, a; w,θ,ã) ∈ Γ C , type (m, θ ) can obtain (θ = θ is not required): 
otherwise;
with u (w,θ ) defined in assumption 3(ã) of the Theorem. By assumption 3 of the Theorem, at a fixed point no consumer chooses a household that gives him or her a nonpositive income.
We will define a Shafer-Sonnenschein utility function based on intrahousehold Pareto-efficiency assuming that the types of man and woman are (m, θ) and (w,θ), respectively, for each price vector p ∈ ∆ and (r mγ , r
By continuity of utility functions, the correspondence P 
Notice that eventually in the fixed point, (
Fifth, we assign an optimal consumption plan β γ for non-externality commodities to each type γ. β γ for singles:
(p; y, h)}. For each price vector p, production plan y, household supply vector h, and corresponding income, these mappings simply assign the optimal consumption vectors to every single household. With continuous and quasi-concave utility functions, singles' β-correspondence is nonempty-valued, upper hemi-continuous (after the minor modification on ∂∆ 1 made below) and convex-valued (when consumption sets are compactified below by means of suitable truncations). 
That is, we assign an optimal no-externality commodity consumption plan for each preference type to describe each preference type's optimal household choice (and excess demand correspondence).
be defined as a Cartesian product of two mappings:
By abusing notation, let us extend the consumption correspondence X :
, since we only consider the case of θ = θ. Let x denote a selection ofX -which is an (extended) consumption planand letX be the collection of allx. For γ = (m, θ, a, w,θ,ã) ∈ Γ C , we writê m, θ, a, w,θ,ã) ). An (extended) commodity consumption planx is optimal if and only ifx ∈β(p, r,x
Sixth, we construct each type's household choice problem. To begin with, we introduce for m ∈ M the notation Γ
For type (w,θ) ∈ W × Θ, we can define α
similarly.
The α-mappings are used to define our population mapping ν below. For
} be the set of population allocations of type (m, θ). Let ν has closed graph. Therefore,
(x)} is locally constant and, hence, ν
is upper hemi-continuous. We can define α 's. This is our population mapping. A representative element of ν(x) is denoted by n ∈ ν(x).
Seventh, we introduce a supply mapping. A supply mapping τ : ∆ Y is such that τ (p) = arg max y∈Y py. A representative element of τ (p) is y ∈ τ (p).
Eighth, we construct an excess demand mapping. An excess demand mapping ζ :
and ζ k (x, n, y)
Again, τ and ζ will be well defined after truncation later on. A representative element of ζ(x, n, y) is denoted by z ∈ ζ(x, n, y). θ, a; w,θ,ã) household is regarded as a local public good for exactly two residents who have appearance types m and w. The provision cost is
= N }, which will be the set of household supply allocations. Since total population including both men and women is N , households will be certainly oversupplied. The choice ∅ assures nonnegative profit of DD. DD's supply correspondence η :
Eleventh, we construct a variation of the Gale-Nikaido price mapping for DD as well. Let ρ :
In order to have a fixed point, θ∈Θ n
and ϕ is composed of
To be precise, η(p, r,x) ).
We are going to truncate sets in the domain of ϕ to obtain compactness and to apply Kakutani's fixed point theorem. Note that the aggregate endowment is bounded above, consumption sets are bounded below, and the aggregate production set is convex having no intersection with R I+K +
\{0}.
By the standard argument, we arrived at the conclusion of Lemma 1 that the set of production vectors y ∈ Y in all feasible allocations is bounded. Let the feasible production set be Y 
is bounded below, since consumption sets are bounded below. By (1), feasible aggregate consumption is bounded above by b + y where b is an upper bound for the aggregate endowment. As a consequence, the set of all feasible excess demand is also bounded.
Let Z ⊂ R I∪K be a compact and convex set that contains all feasible excess demand vectors in its interior. In order to allow a small number of consumers consuming a large amount of private goods in an atomless economy, we follow the technique by Aumann (1966) . For all m ∈ M and all a ∈ A, let X (ã)) w∈W,ã∈A for a natural number s. Thus, the spaceX can also be truncated asX s accordingly. We will consider an equilibrium of the s-truncated economy, and take the limit of an equilibrium sequence for s → ∞.
We need to slightly modify all the mappings for the truncated economy except for the price mapping π. The main problem is well known: If for some price p, a consumer's wealth allows for only consumption vectors on the boundary of her consumption set, then her budget correspondence may fail to be (lower hemi-) continuous, and her demand correspondence may fail to be upper hemi-continuous (a violation of Berge's maximum theorem). Note that under assumption 4 (iii-b), if p 1 > 0 is assured, no such problem exists: each consumer's wealth is positive. Thus, if the domain is confined to∆ 1 , the demand correspondence β is upper hemi-continuous. For other mappings involving prices, we consider two cases: (i) p ∈∆ 1 and (ii) p ∈ ∂∆ 1 . Case (ii) is the only at issue, but we simply map all p ∈ ∂∆ 1 to the entire (compactified) range:
Clearly, if β, τ , and η are nonempty-valued and upper hemi-continuous in ∆ 1 , they are also nonempty-valued and upper hemi-continuous in ∆. As we have explained, a fixed point price vector of the mapping ϕ must lie in∆ 1 and, thus, the above modifications of the mappings do not affect the fixed points.
Hence, the only remaining task we have in order to apply Kakutani's theorem is to show that the mapping π is upper hemi-continuous. We first prove the following lemma: Proof. Note that this type of consumer only cares about his own consumption of non-leisure goods (assumption 4 (iii)), so he always tries to take an action (a job) that maximizes his wealth for each p: a ∈ arg max is contained in a compact set. Hence there exists a convergent subsequence, and we can let x be the limit point. Clearly, max{x 1 , ..., x I+K−J } < ∞. However, by assumption 4 (iii-b), for large enough n, he can achieve higher utility than x by consuming unboundedly higher x 1 . This is a contradiction.
Second, consider the case where the consumption set is truncated by s. Let ) is a stable matching equilibrium.
